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Abstract
Vaccination is hailed as one of the greatest scientific achievements of the past cen-
tury. However, affordability and accessibility prevent low-income countries from
realizing the full benefit of immunization. This study applies operations research
methods to a hypothetically coordinated global vaccine market with quantity-
based discounts to minimize procurement and holding costs while ensuring invest-
ment recovery of manufacturers. The effects on affordability of fixed-costs, holding
costs, cold-chain capacity, and tender length (i.e. the maximum number of years
ahead markets are willing to order supply from producers) are analyzed for each
income-based segment of the global market. Experimental results show that in-
creases in both tender length and cold-chain capacity have a significant positive
influence on affordability for most market segments, especially the low-income seg-
ments. The results reported give insights into how vaccine procurement decisions
could be structured at each income level to improve affordability of the buyers
while ensuring profitability of the producers.
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1 Introduction
Vaccination remains one of the most effective resources to combat infectious diseases, preventing
2-3 million deaths per year, and potentially another 1.5 million should global coverage improve
(World Health Organization, 2018a). In the U.S. alone, the introduction of the Vaccines for Chil-
dren program prevented an estimated 322 million illnesses, 21 million hospitalizations, and $1.38
trillion in total societal costs in the first 20 years of the program’s introduction (Whitney et al.,
2014). Despite this unprecedented success, the full benefit of vaccination has not been realized
by low-income countries that cannot yet afford the costs of increasing immunization.
To improve affordability, the vaccine market has traditionally relied on tiered-pricing policies,
where countries/regions pay different prices based on their income level (GlaxoSmithKline Com-
munications, 2014). Tiered pricing benefits both vaccine producers and buyers by increasing the
customer base of the producers and improving accessibility for the buyers (GAVI, 2010). While
high-income and upper-middle-income countries procure directly from suppliers, some coun-
tries choose to pool their demands and procure together, effectively increasing their power to
negotiate better prices. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and The Pan American
Health Organization (PAHO) are both examples of organizations that have utilized this strategy
to great success (Bare, 2015). And while the benefits of pooled procurement favor the buyers,
the decrease of demand uncertainty helps manufacturers reduce their production costs.
Capacity planning for vaccine production is a complex and expensive process. Lead times range
between 9-22 months, shelf-lives can be as short as 24 months, and demand is often uncertain
(Lemmens et al., 2016). Additionally, the combined effect of high initial investment costs, lengthy
research and development processes, and uncertainty in demand can lead to excess inventory and
low utilization of facilities, which can result in higher prices per dose (Plotkin et al., 2017). In-
creasing the price per dose for vaccines may reduce vaccine demand for certain countries, which
will not only result in lower sell volumes but also higher demand uncertainty.
Vaccines for developing countries are procured primarily through tenders, a call for capacity
commitment, typically for one antigen at a time, by procurement entities, which manufacturers
compete for, based on price, volume, and reliability and can be won by multiple manufacturers
(Smith et al., 2011). Currently, there are three widely used tender-based procurement options:
(i) ’single round’ where manufacturers offer a single bid, (ii) ’multi-round’ where manufacturers
are allowed to improve their bids each round, and (iii) ’the hybrid model’ where manufacturers
get one round to offer multiple options (The GAVI Alliance, 2011). Alternatively, countries can
directly negotiate with manufacturers; this buying model is typically used in situations with less
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competitive pressure (i.e. 1-2 competing manufacturers) and involves deeper discussion of the
objectives of both parties. While tender length varies by organization and vaccine, UNICEF con-
tract award reports from 2013-2020 show that typical tender lengths range from 12 - 36 months
with potential for extensions (UNICEF Supply Division, 2020). In a 2011 report, The GAVI Al-
liance discussed the potential of 5 to 10-year awards to further reduce demand uncertainty. Ten-
ders of this length bring two risks: missing out on price improvements due to locked prices, and
excluding manufacturers (The GAVI Alliance, 2011).
In this study, we analyze the effect of tenders of 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-years in length for a multi-
antigen vaccine market, where demand for several antigens is satisfied by a single tender call. In
this market, a buyer has the option of procuring vaccines to satisfy its needs over multiple years,
up to the tender length, and take advantage of the quantity-based discounts offered by produc-
ers. Purchasing too many doses, however, will cause holding costs to spike, while purchasing too
few will result in minimal price reduction. Ideally, buyers should make purchasing decisions that
allow manufacturers to remain profitable. Under such conditions, would increasing the tender
horizon increase affordability for buyers while maintaining the profitability of producers?
In recent years, there have been a few key studies searching for enhanced affordability across the
global vaccine market. Proano et al. (2012) and Mosquera (2015) consider models in which an
entity coordinates procurement decisions across market segments consisting of countries of sim-
ilar income and immunization schedules, though both studies were limited to a one-year tender
horizon.
This study explores the effect on affordability of having different tender horizon in a coordinated
vaccine market for multiple antigens where manufacturers offer discounts proportional to volume,
and buyers seek to meet their long term antigen needs. We propose a mixed-integer non-linear
programming formulation (MINLP) to model a coordinated vaccine market and determine the
optimal procurement decisions for a coordinating entity that aims to maximize affordability for
the buyers and ensure a desired return for the manufacturers.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a Literature Review which ex-
plores approaches to both vaccine pricing and procurement as well as operations research ap-
proaches to optimizing vaccine procurement decisions. Section 3 describes our methodology, in-
cluding the mathematical model and a proposed experimental framework to answer our research
question. Section 4 examines how cost is altered as experimental factors change, whether or not
procuring multi-year tenders is beneficial, and which procurement strategies produced high/low
performance. Finally, section 5 offers concluding remarks.
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2 Literature Review
This paper is related to two streams of literature, (i) vaccine pricing and procurement decisions
and (ii) vaccine market modeling strategies from an operations research perspective. Literature
involving vaccine pricing and procurement focuses on the situations in which vaccine produc-
ers are inclined to offer affordable prices to the buyers, though this is largely from the viewpoint
of the producer. We examine studies that rely on game theory to understand manufacturing
pricing. The rest of this section presents studies that discuss mechanisms to increase equity in
low-income countries through subsidies and securing access to vaccine supply. While this liter-
ature offers mechanics by which manufacturers may lower their prices, the scope is limited to
single-year periods and prices are unrelated to procurement quantity. Operations research ap-
proaches focus largely on the minimization of the overall cost to satisfy demand, though these
studies are limited to single-year procurement. Missing from the literature is the combination of
both streams, where demand is fulfilled with minimum cost by utilizing discounts proportional to
quantity.
2.1 Vaccine Pricing and Procurement
Vaccine manufacturers keep confidential their pricing practices, however, according to Medicine
Index (2019), manufacturers try to incorporate equitable pricing schemes to make their vaccines
affordable, hence adjusting their prices to meet the needs of the consumers. GlaxoSmithKline,
one of the largest vaccine manufacturers, stated that the tender length and current coverage of
a target population are among the main considerations when making pricing decisions (Glaxo-
SmithKline Communications, 2014).
Efforts to define vaccine pricing in a market via modeling approaches have often relied on ap-
plications of game-theory where manufacturers compete against one another to offer the lowest
bid. Robbins et al. (2014) analyzed the United States pediatric vaccine market using a static
Bertrand Oligopoly pricing model where manufacturers offer homogeneous products and price
them strategically to optimize their profits while taking into consideration how each pricing de-
cision will affect future decisions of competitors. Behzad et al. (2015) and Behzad and Jacobson
(2016) expand on this work by suggesting a Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin pricing schema in
which capacity restrictions and product differentiation are introduced, though only for the pric-
ing of a single product in a single market. All three papers support the existence of a Nash equi-
librium where no manufacturer can change their price to increase their profits, which exists only
when manufacturers are at capacity (Robbins et al. (2014) Behzad et al. (2015) and Behzad and
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Jacobson (2016)). However, these studies considered their analysis only on the US market and
for a single vaccine.
The vaccine procurement process (for developing countries) is complex due to the large number
of decisions that procuring entities must make, which are increasingly difficult to do depending
on how much a country values vaccination, its ability to pay, and how much external support a
country/entity is receiving. Kaddar et al. (2019) highlights the challenges of long term vaccine
procurement planning for smaller/poorer countries. It describes difficulties in implementing pool
procurement due to disagreements on a common set of vaccines to buy, the reluctance of manu-
facturers to offer competitive prices, and minimal demand predictability to name a few. Martin
et al. (2019) examines three different contract designs for developing countries to maximize the
utility of subsidies and increase commitment capacity from manufacturers. The contracts are
designed to (i) subsidize all doses up to a maximum level, independent on the volume, (ii) of-
fer subsidize vaccines at two different levels based on their volume, and (iii) subsidize on sales
and on unused capacity to mitigate over-commitments. Design (i) generated the greatest capac-
ity commitment for all budget levels, though results varied greatly depending on the per dose
manufacturing costs. Martin et al. (2019) focuses on one year and examines subsidies to manu-
facturers rather than discounts to purchasers. However, it displays that manufacturers are very
sensitive to commitment costs, showing there is value in having certainty in their demand.
2.2 Operations Research Approaches
Operations Research approaches to vaccine procurement have come from a few different direc-
tions. Behzad et al. (2012) proposes a vaccine selection algorithm to find the lowest overall cost
formulary which satisfies the childhood immunization schedule and uses the results to compare
the economic value of each vaccine and make strategical pricing suggestions based on the re-
sults. Hall et al. (2008) suggests a model to minimize immunization costs over a set of periods
for a childhood immunization schedule, while also minimizing over-immunization. Robbins and
Jacobson (2011) shifts the focus to pricing with the Monopsonist Vaccine Formulary Pricing
and Purchasing Problem (MV3P), which also minimizes the cost of immunization and allows
price negotiations. This study also ensures the profitability of the manufacturers, however, this
model is limited to United States Pediatric vaccines and only considers short-term affordabil-
ity and profitability. Mosquera (2015) goes in a different direction, where instead of minimizing
cost or immunization, he maximizes total social surplus, which he defines as the total profit plus
the expected total customer surplus, to provide as much immunization coverage and manufac-
turer profitability as possible under budgetary and capacity restrictions. However, Mosquera also
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adds stochasticity to the model to understand the effects of reservation price uncertainty, market
segmentation, and the interest rate at which manufacturers recover their investment, though he
finds only market segmentation has a significant positive impact on affordability, with a negative
impact on profitability.
Proano et al. (2012) proposes the Antigen Bundling Problem (ABP), which was the basis for
Mosquera’s work and similarly aims to maximize total social surplus by optimizing procurement
quantities. The key assumption of this paper is that all of the procurement decisions are being
coordinated by a monopsonistic entity, which represents a large buyer like UNICEF (The United
Nations Children’s Fund) or PAHO (The Pan American Health Organization), who can negoti-
ate prices. This model carries the benefit of considering the global vaccine market, allowing for
segmentation of the market to have as many or as few markets as needed, depending on the ap-
plication. In the case of ABP, the segmentation is most useful in the implementation of tiered
pricing. Additionally, the added dimension of time is not considered in this model, procurement
is only considered for a single period.
3 Methodology
In this section, we describe the dynamics of a hypothetical vaccine market where a single coordi-
nating entity (or coordinator) makes procuring decisions on behalf of buyers purchasing vaccines
from multiple producers, where vaccines can be purchased with tenders that span over multiple
years. Using this assumed market, we propose a mathematical programming model with the ob-
jective of minimizing the total procuring costs of the buyers.
For the following model, it is assumed that in a competitive tender-system, manufacturers aim
to secure long-term demand by offering price discounts based on order quantities. Additionally,
it is also assumed that the discounts are linearly proportional to the procurement quantity. Fur-
thermore, it is considered that holding and fixed costs are significant.
We consider a global market consisting of five market segments, Low Income (LIC), Lower-Middle
Income (LMIC), Upper-Middle Income (UMIC), High Income (HIC) and the USA (USA), where
each segment groups countries with similar income levels and antigen needs, except for the USA
market, which is considered by itself due to its significantly higher prices per dose. Market seg-
ments have a required number of antigen doses per year but are limited in how many vaccines
they can buy by their available cold-chain capacity, supplier availability, and an assumed max-
imum tender length (i.e. they cannot procure more than λ years worth of future forecasted de-
mand). Additionally, a minimum return on investment is required by each of the manufacturers,
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based on an estimated initial investment and payback period.
The presented models are an MINLP (3.1), and a Mixed Integer Quadratically Constrained Pro-
gram (MIQCP) (3.2). Problem 3.1 will be referred to as the Time-Indexed Vaccine Procurement
model (TIVP) and problem 3.2 will be referred to as the Quadratic Time-Indexed Vaccine Pro-
curement model (QTIVP). Problem TIVP is explained first, as problem QTIVP is derived from
problem TIVP, although in the solution process, problem QTIVP is solved first and its solution
is used as a starting point for problem TIVP. Problem TIVP is nonlinear and has a non-positive
semi-definite hessian, resulting in the formulation requiring nonlinear methods to find a solution.
This means good solutions take a long time to find and optimal solutions are impossible to guar-
antee. To enhance both the quality and speed of the solutions, we propose a two-stage modeling
approach where problem QTIVP is used to quickly find a strong, feasible solution, which serves
as a starting point for problem TIVP.
Solve Model 3.2 Solve Model 3.1X*, Q*, y*, I*
Figure 1: Diagram of interaction between Models 3.1 and 3.2
3.1 Problem TIVP
Sets:
V : set of vaccines
A: set of antigens
M : set of markets
P : set of Producers
T : set of time periods
Pv: subset of producers who make vaccine v
Va: subset of vaccines that contain antigen a
Vp: subset of vaccines made by producer p
12
Parameters
da,m,t: Demand in market m at time t for antigen a
Sv,p,t: Supply capacity of producer p to make vaccine v at time t
kv,m,t: Maximum batch size of vaccine v market m can buy
Rv,m,p: Price of vaccine v for market m, produced by producer p
R′v,m: Average price of vaccine v for market m
Jv,p Yearly return on investment producer p needs for vaccine v
γ : Maximum discount, achieved at highest allowed procurement quantity
Ca,m,t Maximum cold-chain capacity of antigen a for market m at period t
λ : Maximum tender length to consider when buying (i.e. λ = 3 allows tenders of 1, 2, and 3
years)
G: Set up cost to make an order of any vaccine
H: Annual holding cost as proportion of price
Variables
Xt,uv,m,p: Number of vaccines bought from producer p for market m at time t to be received at pe-
riod u
Qv,m,p,t: Procuring commitments of vaccine v at time t over lambda future periods.
ym,v,t: =

1 if market m buys vaccine v at time t
0, o.w.
Ia,m,t: Stock level of antigens in market m at time t
Dv,m,p,t: Discount given from producer p to market m for buying vaccine v at period t, linearly pro-




































Qv,m,p,t ∀ v ∈ V m ∈M p ∈ Pv t ∈ T (3)




































Ca,m,t ∀ m ∈M t ∈ T (8)
The objective of the model (1) minimizes the total purchasing cost of all vaccines procured over
a span of T years with fixed cost penalties (G) for every order made and holding cost penalties
(H ) for every vaccine held in inventory.
Constraint (2) ensures that the total procuring commitments at period t are equal to all pro-
curement orders made by each market at t over the next λ periods, with the current year being
included in that time horizon.
Constraint (3) defines the discount by a linear relationship of the procurement quantity, consid-
ering the maximum possible discount γ. The higher the procurement order committed at time t,
the higher the discount per dose. Constraint (4) ensures that a procurement order can only be
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made at a period where an order is placed. If y =0, then the procurement commitment should
also be zero. kv,m,t is the maximum commitment quantity allowed.
Constraint (5) ensures that the vaccines being bought plus the current inventory are enough to
cover demand. This constraint also defines the antigen stock level to be what was purchased for
this period plus any previous stock, minus the demand.
Constraint (6) restricts the procurement quantities bought from each producer to be less than
the total overall supply capacity of each producer. Constraint (7) ensures that each producer
meets an annualized minimum return on investment each year, across all vaccines they are sell-
ing. This means that each manufacturer is allowed to meet the aggregate profit expectation of
all vaccines they are selling by only selling one vaccine.
Lastly, constraint (8) ensures that the current antigen stock level, plus whatever has been pur-
chased for the current period is less than the aggregate cold-chain capacity across all antigens for
each of the markets. While it is true that vaccines have different storage requirements, meaning
that storing 10 doses of one vaccine may require more cold-chain capacity than storing 10 doses
of a different vaccine, for this model we assume that storage requirements are uniform across
all vaccines. Also, there are several necessary starting conditions which will be listed in the ap-
pendix.
However, note that since D is a function of Q, the objective in (1), and constraint (7) are quadratic
expressions, resulting in a mixed-integer non-linear programming problem, which depending on
the data input can result in a non-positive semi-definite hessian (i.e, problems in which is not
possible to guarantee optimality).
As an alternative, the following subsection offers a linearized version of problem TIVP, which
linearizes the objective function (1) by using the derivative of the objective. This linearized for-
mulation (QTIVP) offers the benefit of a short solution time with the use of a quadratic solver
but may underestimate the impact of keeping a high inventory due to the loss of holding cost in
the objective. Note, however, that the objective of problem QTIVP is the derivative of the ob-
jective of problem TIVP, so problem QTIVP will be negative at points where the quadratic term
objective of problem TIVP is decreasing. Therefore, by minimizing problem QTIVP, our search
through the feasible region follows a path which results in problem TIVP decreasing, leading us
to a strong starting point for problem TIVP.
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3.2 Quadratic Time-Indexed Vaccine Procurement Model
To facilitate the solution of the TIVP model in 3.1. we first solve a modified version of the prob-
lem that results from a formulation that shares the same constraints as problem TIVP. but dif-
fers in its objective.
The objective of the proposed formulation corresponds to the derivative of the objective with
respect to the committed quantity variables (all Qvmpt). The resulting formulation has a linear
objective function and a quadratic constraint, which corresponds to a Quadratic programming
model, which is can be solved in tractable time, which we refer as the quadratic time-indexed
vaccine procurement model (QTIVP).
Obj 1 = Qv,m,p,t ∗Rv,m,p(1−Dv,m,p,t)
This can then be expanded by replacing Dv,m,p,t by its definition (3), resulting in:
Obj 1 = Qv,m,p,t ∗Rv,m,p(1− γkv,mQv,m,p,t)





After some algebraic manipulation and by taking the derivative with respect to Qv,m,p,t:
Obj 2 = Rv,m ∗ (1− ( 2γkv,m,t )Qv,m,p,t)
This also means the fixed cost terms and the holding cost terms of the objective function (1) are














s.t. Constraints (2)− (8)
Problem TIVP is nonlinear due to a non-convex quadratic objective and convex quadratic con-
straint, though the objective prevents the resulting program from being solved with quadratic
methods. The model can, however, be solved with nonlinear methods, though depending on the
data input, this can result in a non-positive semi-definite hessian (i.e, problems which are not
possible to guarantee optimality). As an alternative, a two-stage model is proposed. Problem
QTIVP is derived from problem TIVP by using the derivative of the objective function while
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keeping all other constraints. This model shares the same feasible region and similar objective
function behavior due to the use of the derivative of the objective. Additionally, this model has
can be solved very quickly by using quadratic solving methods. Problem QTIVP is then used
to pass a strong starting point on to problem QTIVP, which begins searching for an optimal
point in the area of the given starting point using nonlinear search methods. The purpose of this
two-stage model is not only to improve the quality of the solutions but also to improve solution
speed to allow for experimentation.
3.3 Experimentation
To understand the effect on affordability and profit of vaccine procurement over time on a coor-
dinated vaccine market, we explore a broad number of experimental conditions on the market of
three vaccines. For this paper, the global vaccine market is assumed to consist of five main mar-
kets: Low Income (LIC), Lower-Middle Income (LMIC), Upper-Middle Income (UMIC), High
Income (HIC), and the USA, where demand is aggregated into groups of countries that procure
similar vaccine schedules at a single price per group based on the countries’ willingness to pay. It
is also assumed that each of these markets has an adequate budget to procure all of the vaccines
they wish to buy and that they are restricted by total holding capacity.
In this study we will test the proposed optimization-based approach on the following three vac-
cines: Human Papilloma Virus (HPV), Rotavirus (Rota), and PCV (Pneumococcal conjugate
vaccine). These vaccines do not share antigens with each other, and hence they are considered
monovalent vaccines for our proposed models. However, the PCV vaccine offers protection to
several disease strains. HPV, Rota, and PCV are at the top of the list of candidate vaccines to
be introduced in the Low-Income and Low-middle-Income countries. HPV vaccine prevents cer-
vical cancer, which causes nearly 200,000 lives every year. Rotavirus is the third leading cause of
mortality among children under 5 years of age, with over 255 million episodes of severe gastroin-
testinal episodes on young children, and nearly 200,000 deaths per year (by 2016). Until 2005,
700,000 children died each year of pneumoccoal infections. In terms of costs, these three vaccines
are among the most expensive vaccines per dose available, as they were initially tailored to high
income market segments. The introduction of these vaccines in the immunization programs of
low-income countries in such a way that they are affordable and profitable is a key goal in the
global health community.
For the following experiments described in Table 1, we apply the two-stage optimization proce-
dure to the experimental scenarios resulting from controlling four experimental factors at differ-
ent levels. We control the storage capacity of the market segments, the fixed and holding cost
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levels, as well as the tender lengths.
Table 1: Time Indexed Model Experiments
Experimental Factor Levels
Cold-Chain Capacity (Years Demand) 1.5 2.0 2.5
Fixed Cost $4M $7M $10M
Holding Cost 17% 22% 27%
Tender Length (λ) 1,2,3 and 4 years
The resulting experiment contains three factors with 3 levels and 1 factor with four levels, cre-
ating 108 unique sets of conditions under which models 3.1 and 3.2 are run. Scenarios with a
tender length of one year are used as a benchmark to evaluate whether tender lengths of 2,3 or 4
years have an advantage in affordability compared to 1-year tenders. In this way, results can be
analyzed as a 34 factorial design with change in cost by increasing tender length as the response
variable.
Cold-chain capacity is generally difficult to estimate, but for these experiments, cold-chain ca-
pacity was estimated using yearly antigen demand values for each of the markets. It was also
assumed that each market had enough cold-chain capacity to cover at least 1.5 years worth of
demand. The max capacity was then set to 2.5 years worth of demand as a general estimate, us-
ing 0.5-year increments.
Similarly, holding costs are also difficult to generalize due to the cold chain being more difficult
to maintain depending on the delivery location, but according to American Academy of Pedi-
atrics (2014) estimated the indirect expenses to be between 17% to 28% and a 2016 report by
the World Health Organization showed that cold chain costs for the Ebola vaccine totaled close
to 30% of the total Vaccination costs and roughly 66% of those costs are unrelated to trans-
portation (WHO GEVIT, 2016). So for these experiments, holding cost was assumed to range
somewhere between 17% and 27% of the price of the vaccines.
For this study, fixed cost is described as all costs a country/market incurs in setting up its cold
chain capacity, transportation, approvals, forecasting, and distribution processes needed to offer
a vaccine under its immunization program. Though what is truly important to observe with the
fixed cost is the interaction with holding cost. It is a complex cost to estimate, though what is
truly important to observe is the interaction with holding cost. While higher fixed costs encour-
age higher order quantities, higher holding costs encourage lower order quantities. So for this
experiment, and without loss of generality we assume that the fixed cost around the same level
of magnitude as holding costs (roughly between $4M and $10 per year).
Key outputs to understand the effect of buying over time are the overall cost to each market
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(fixed and holding costs included) and the procurement quantities for each period. The results of
the experiments using λ values of 2 through 4 are compared to the scenarios where λ is 1. Sce-
narios with a λ value of 1 represent buying in single period stages, and λ values of 2 through 4
represent buying ahead of time for future periods. The difference between the overall costs of
scenarios with λ values of 1 and those with λ values greater than 1 represent how much more or
less was spent by procuring ahead of time. Analyzing the difference between these two values
can help to understand whether procuring over time improves profitability always, under cer-
tain scenarios, or never. On the other hand, procurement quantities simply give insight into how
profitability was achieved. The strategies used, in terms of how much inventory was held and
how procurement schedules were balanced are described in this section.
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4 Results
In this section, the results of the experimental design are examined to determine the level of in-
fluence of different tender lengths on affordability. We examine the effects of tender length on
each of the individual markets and the market as a whole. The effects of the experiment were
analyzed using a 34 factorial design. Pareto charts for the standardized effects were created us-
ing 16 degrees of freedom (80 observations total - 64 for linear, 2-way interaction, and 3-way in-
teraction terms) and a significance level of α = 0.05 (i.e. bars that cross the red reference line
are considered significant). We consider the difference in procurement costs (order purchase +
holding + set up cost) at different tender lengths with respect to the costs incurred with the
benchmark 1-year tender. The difference in procurement costs is recorded for each of the 5 mar-
ket segments, and the overall global market, resulting in six response variables.
An overview of the results is shown in Table 2, which displays the percentage of scenarios for
each market that saw a reduction in cost in comparison of 1-year tender length to the given ten-
der length. The table shows most markets saw a benefit to increasing tender length, with the
LIC, LMIC, UMIC, and USA markets seeing the highest rate of price reduction. Though the
HIC market gained benefit by changing from 1-year to 2-year tenders, the cost reduction benefit
was reduced at 3-year and 4-year tenders. Overall, 70.4% - 81.5% of scenarios saw a reduction in
cost by increasing tender length from 1-year to multi-year. Additionally, in Table 3, the magni-
tude of the cost reductions (excluding scenarios where costs increased) are displayed, and show
that the LIC market and the USA saw the largest average reductions at up to 5.88% and 5.43%
respectively when using multi-year tenders.
Table 2: Percent of scenarios in which costs were reduced by increasing from 1-year tender to
multi-year tender
Tender Length = 2 Tender Length = 3 Tender Length = 4
LIC 81.5% 92.5% 96.3%
LMIC 62.9% 74.1% 81.5%
UMIC 62.3% 74.1% 81.5%
HIC 59.2% 55.5% 55.5%
USA 81.5% 88.9% 92.6%
Total Market 70.4% 74.1% 81.5%
It should also be noted that the increased affordability from increasing tender length is not at
the cost of the profitability of the producers. Every producer maintained their expected return
for every combination of factors, though there were some overall profit reductions when com-
pared to scenarios with a 1-year tender length, as seen in Table 4. An analysis using a 34 fac-
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Table 3: Average magnitude of cost reductions for each market at each tender length
Tender Length = 2 Tender Length = 3 Tender Length = 4
LIC 2.89% 3.62% 5.88%
LMIC 1.50% 1.88% 3.53%
UMIC 2.54% 2.46% 5.12%
HIC 2.94% 2.36% 4.44%
USA 2.91% 5.43% 5.30%
Total Market 1.80% 2.19% 3.66%
torial design and change in earnings for each of the producers as responses showed that tender
length was not a significant factor for change in earnings for any of the producers, though cold-
chain capacity was significant for every producer. So while many resulted in reduced earning for
the producers, the reduction cannot be attributed to tender length. Figure 2 displays the total
change in earnings of all the experimental scenarios and it can be seen that the range of total
change is limited to (-3.5% - 2.5%) and there is no clear correlation between tender length and
change in earnings. Supplemental figures are included in the appendix.
Table 4: Percent of scenarios in which producer earnings were reduced
Tender Length = 2 Tender Length = 3 Tender Length = 4
P1 14.8% 14.8% 14.8%
P2 100% 100% 92.6%
P3 33.3% 22.2% 18.5%
P4 51.8% 62.9% 62.9%
4.1 Procurement Costs by Market
Procurement costs are broken down by market segment, to analyze the change in procurement
cost for each market separately. Each market has a response variable that represents the differ-
ence in procurement cost between the benchmark scenarios (i.e. scenarios with a tender length of
1 year) and the scenario of the given multi-year tender length.
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Figure 2: Effect of tender length on the total producer earnings at 3 levels of cold-chain capac-
ity
Let:
C = Change in Procurement Cost
PC = Procurement Costs (Order Purchase + holding + fixed costs)
M = Market (LIC, LMIC, UMIC, HIC, USA, Total)
G = Fixed Cost Level ($4M, $7M, $10M)
H = Holding Cost Level (17%, 22%, 27%)
I = Cold-Chain Capacity Level (1.5, 2, 2.5 (Years Demand))





M ∀ M,G,H, I,λ
Each market has unique pricing and demand characteristics, so the change in procurement cost
for each market is analyzed separately to determine whether the significance of tender length
differs depending on the characteristics of the segment. In this case, significant effects represent
factors that are causing a significant change in procurement costs. An initial pruning of the re-
sults found that no four-way interactions were significant, so only interactions up to three factors
were included.
As seen in Figures 3-8, the significance of different tender lengths (A) as a factor varies depend-
ing on the market segment. While tender length is highly significant in the LIC, LMIC, UMIC,
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USA, and on aggregate across all market segments, it is less significant for the HIC market seg-
ment. This suggests that under the conditions of this experiment, tender length consistently has
a significant impact on affordability, though the degree of this impact is partially dependant on
the characteristics of the procuring market.
Figure 3: Pareto of main effects for change in spending in the LIC mar-
ket
Figure 4: Pareto of main effects for change in spending in the LMIC
market
Figures 3-8 also display the impact of cold-chain capacity, holding cost, and fixed cost. Cold-
chain capacity and the three-way interaction between cold-chain capacity, holding cost and fixed
cost are also significant in every market segment. For an example of why these factors are signif-
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icant, consider what would happen to the difference in procurement costs if cold-chain capacity
was low: increased tender length would allow for more doses to be ordered at once and received
over multiple years, but the number of doses received at any given time would still be limited
by cold-chain capacity. Cold-chain capacity is further increasing the number of doses that can
be bought at any given time. This increase in potential order quantity is penalized by increased
holding costs and supplemented by reduced fixed costs, as fewer orders are made, but more in-
ventory is held.
In figures 9 - 14 it is seen that the change in spending induced by tender length, does lead to re-
duced costs in most market segments. A clear downward trend in spending can be seen in the
LIC, LMIC, UMIC, USA, and Total market segments, though the USA seems to get the largest
price decrease going from a tender length of 2 years to a tender length of 3 years, and the HIC
market segment sees an increase in cost by changing tender length from 2 years to 3 years. Ad-
ditionally, increases in fixed cost and holding costs cause an increase in procurement costs across
all markets, though there is also an interaction happening between these factors and cold-chain
capacity. An increase in cold-chain capacity has been shown to decrease procurement costs, as
larger orders can be made to take advantage of the quantity-based discounts. Interactions occur
between cold-chain capacity, fixed cost, and holding cost though as an increase in fixed cost en-
courages the buyer to hold inventory, while larger holding costs discourage inventory. So while
an increase in cold-chain capacity can greatly reduce procurement costs, it is most effective at
low holding cost levels.
24
Figure 5: Pareto of main effects for change in spending in the UMIC
market
Figure 6: Pareto of main effects for change in spending in the HIC mar-
ket
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Figure 7: Pareto of main effects for change in spending in the USA
market
Figure 8: Pareto of main effects for change in spending across the Total
market
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Figure 9: Main effects for change in spending in the LIC market
Figure 10: Main effects plot for change in spending in the LMIC market
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Figure 11: Main effects for change in spending in the UMIC market
Figure 12: Main effects plot for change in spending in the HIC market
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Figure 13: Main effects for change in spending in the USA market
Figure 14: Main effects plot for change in spending in the Total market
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4.2 Effect of Tender Length by Capacity Level
In this section, the effect of tender length is examined for each level of capacity (1.5, 2.0, and 2.5
times the 1 year demand). Capacity is being inspected as it was by far the most significant fac-
tor from section 4.1, which brings the question at what point does cold-chain capacity become
important. This section explores what degree the effect of different tender lengths on procure-
ment costs at different cold-chain capacities. Figures 15 - 20 examine the effects of tender length
on change in procurement cost in 3 different scenarios: low, medium, and high cold-chain capac-
ity. Each point in these charts represents the percent change in procurement cost by increasing
tender length from 1 year and the line represents the trend as tender length increases.
Figure 15: Effect of tender length on LIC procurement costs at 3 levels of cold-chain capacity
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Figure 16: Effect of tender length on LMIC procurement costs at 3 levels of cold-chain capacity
Figure 17: Effect of tender length on UMIC procurement costs at 3 levels of cold-chain capacity
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Figure 18: Effect of tender length on HIC procurement costs at 3 levels of cold-chain capacity
Figure 19: Effect of tender length on USA procurement costs at 3 levels of cold-chain capacity
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Figure 20: Effect of tender length on the total market procurement costs at 3 levels of cold-
chain capacity
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Figures 15 - 20 display a relationship between tender length and cold-chain capacity. While most
markets gain some benefit from increasing tender length at any cold-chain capacity level, the
benefit of increased tender length is amplified at a high level of cold-chain capacity. This is due
to one-year tender length procurement plans being unable to take advantage of high cold-chain
capacity because of the minimal demand each tender seeks to cover. In contrast, high cold-chain
capacity with long tender lengths allows the buyer to achieve even greater discounts. The LIC
and USA markets display how effective high cold-chain capacity and long tender lengths are at
reducing procurement costs. Long tender procurement plans in these markets reduced procure-
ment costs by as high as 18% when compared to one-year tender length plans.
4.3 Procurement Behavior
In this section, we examine why having multi-year tenders offered more saving opportunities for
buyers than a single-year tender. Procurement patterns over 10 years are shown for all 6 markets
(LIC, LMIC, UMIC, HIC, USA, and Total) considering that the vaccine markets for HPV, PCV,
and Rota are satisfied with tenders of 1-year and 4-years duration. We juxtapose the quantities
procured at each period, the inventory held, and the total procurement cost for 1-year and 4-
year tender length procurement plans to determine which behaviors create cost savings
For the following figures, cold-chain capacity, holding cost, and fixed costs were fixed to their
high levels due to the high change seen between 1-year and 4-years tender length procurement
plans under these conditions. In Figures 21 - 26, we see that a common strategy is used by ev-
ery market to purchase Rota and PCV under the 4-year tender length procurement plan: a large
initial quantity is bought, then orders become smaller. It is important to note that demand for
each antigen is rising over over the years, so the large initial orders secure supply for the buyers
multiple years in advance. This behavior is especially prevalent for the LIC and USA markets
where the order size tapers down very quickly, as these initial orders were especially large in pro-
portion to their demand. The USA market is an especially interesting case as this is the only
market where large quantities of HPV are bought, likely to lower the price HPV, which is very
high in this market. Given that supply is limited, the model has given precedence to give larger
orders to the USA to reduce purchase costs as much as possible. Overall, we can see that from
an order quantity perspective, the four-year tender length procurement system tends to procure
very large initial orders to reduce the overall cost per dose of each vaccine.
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Figure 21: LIC Order quantities of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length
procurement plans
Figure 22: LMIC Order quantities of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length
procurement plans
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Figure 23: UMIC Order quantities of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length
procurement plans
Figure 24: HIC Order quantities of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length
procurement plans
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Figure 25: USA Order quantities of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length
procurement plans
Figure 26: Total Order quantities of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length
procurement plans
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Figures 27 - 32 display the inventory that each market is holding of each vaccine. These figures
show that despite order quantities generally being higher under the 4-year tender length procure-
ment plan, inventory is reduced quite drastically in some cases. Even more interesting is that
despite 1st-year order quantities generally being much larger in the 4-year tender length pro-
curement plan than the 1-year tender length plan, inventories in year 1 are much lower for the
4-year tender length plan. This is because, under the 4-year tender length plan, the commitment
is spread out and received over multiple years. So even though the commitments made in the
1-year tender length plans were generally smaller or approximately the same magnitude as the
commitments made under the 4-year tender length plan and, the same overall number of vac-
cines were procured across all markets, the 4-year tender plan resulted in less inventory being
held.
Figure 27: LIC Inventory of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length procure-
ment plans
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Figure 28: LMIC Inventory of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length pro-
curement plans
Figure 29: UMIC Inventory of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length pro-
curement plans
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Figure 30: HIC Inventory of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length pro-
curement plans
Figure 31: USA Inventory of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length pro-
curement plans
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Figure 32: Total Inventory of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length pro-
curement plans
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The effects of commitment quantities and inventory held are displayed in Figures 33 - 38 where
one-year and 4-year tender length procurement plans are compared. It should be noted, that un-
der this chosen set of conditions, every market purchased every year, so fixed-costs were left out
of the figures as they were uniform across all markets. As expected, holding costs are generally
much lower under the 4-year tender length plan and purchase costs are typically high in the first
year, then taper off. However, Figure 39 shows that for this particular solution, purchase costs
were only lower for HPV in the 4-year tender length plan and slightly higher for PCV and Rota.
In this scenario, cost savings are achieved primarily through inventory reduction and resulted in
a 6.7% aggregate procurement cost reduction. This behavior is somewhat dependant on the con-
ditions of the market though, as the presented scenario had very high holding cost, resulting in
an emphasis on inventory reduction.
Figure 33: LIC procurement costs of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length
procurement plans
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Figure 34: LMIC procurement costs of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender
length procurement plans
Figure 35: UMIC procurement costs of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender
length procurement plans
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Figure 36: HIC procurement costs of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender length
procurement plans
Figure 37: USA procurement costs of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender
length procurement plans
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Figure 38: Total procurement costs of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and 4-year tender
length procurement plans
Figure 39: 10-year aggregated total procurement costs of HPV, PCV and Rota with 1-year and
4-year tender length procurement plans
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5 Conclusion
This study considers a hypothetical coordinated global vaccine market over a time span and
where price discounts are given based on order quantity. Tender length, or the maximum num-
ber of years ahead markets are willing to order supply from producers, is experimented on to
determine whether an increased tender length leads to a reduced overall cost. The methodology
used a Two-stage optimization process that first generates feasible solutions that will be used by
an MINLP formulation to determine near-optimal solutions. The cold-chain capacity of each of
the procuring markets, fixed cost to order vaccines, holding cost rate, and tender length were all
experimented on to determine whether there are conditions where overall cost was or was not re-
duced. Increases in tender length and cold-chain capacity were found to be highly significant in
reducing overall procurement costs for almost all markets. Examining the procurement behav-
ior of each market and comparing one-year and four-year tender procurement plans, we found
that an increased tender length drastically reduced inventory costs despite increasing commit-
ment quantities. Cost reductions were especially high for the Low Income, Lower-Middle Income,
and Upper-Middle Income markets, which suggests that a system under which these groups pro-
cure with longer tender lengths while other markets procure smaller tender lengths may mini-
mize procurement costs for the lower-income groups.
There were a few assumptions that are vital to this study, the first of which is the assumption
that vaccine producers are willing to discount higher quantity orders in exchange for a reduc-
tion in uncertainty. There is some evidence of these discounts being issued in scenarios such as
pooled procurement, where multiple procuring entities buy together to help negotiate prices, but
the guarantee of a discount to all procuring entities is an assumption made for this model. Addi-
tionally, since the discount rate is unknown, it is assumed to be linearly related to procurement
quantity. Furthermore, reservation prices of vaccines for each market were generalized by aver-
aging the GNI adjusted vaccine prices of the countries belonging to each market segment. For
this model, reservation prices were also scaled linearly with GNI, which is an assumption made
due to lack of complete price transparency but is grounded in the fact that reservation prices do
scale with GNI.
The results of this research are a step towards developing strategies for long-term vaccine pro-
curement plans to help aid in increasing the affordability of vaccines while concurrently ensuring
the producers of these vaccines remain to maintain their sustainability.
46
Appendices
Appendix A - Initial Conditions Constraints
Xv,m,p,t,u = 0 ∀v ∈ V m ∈M p ∈ Pv t ∈ (TMin − λ)..(TMin − 1) u ∈ (TMin − λ)..(TMax + λ)
(2)
Xv,m,p,t,u = 0 ∀v ∈ V m ∈M p ∈ Pv t ∈ (TMax + 1)..(TMin + λ) u ∈ (TMin − λ)..(TMax + λ)
(3)
Qv,m,p,t = 0 ∀v ∈ V m ∈M p ∈ Pv t ∈ (TMin − λ)..(TMin − 1))
(4)
Xv,m,p,t,u = 0 ∀v ∈ V m ∈M p ∈ Pv t ∈ T u ∈ (TMax + 1)..(TMax + λ)
(5)
Ia,m,TMin−1 = 0 ∀a ∈ A ∀m ∈M
(6)
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Appendix B - Residual Plots
Figure B.1: Residual plots for change in cost in LIC market
Figure B.2: Residual plots for change in cost in LMIC market
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Figure B.3: Residual plots for change in cost in UMIC market
Figure B.4: Residual plots for change in cost in HIC market
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Figure B.5: Residual plots for change in cost in USA market
Figure B.6: Residual plots for change in cost in Total market
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Appendix C - Country Status



























Burkina Faso LIC 757.613
Burundi LIC 312.732











Costa Rica UMIC 12690.6




Czech Rep. HIC 24569.1
Denmark HIC 61732.6
Djibouti LMIC 3088.16




El Salvador LMIC 4126.15
























































































Saint Lucia UMIC 11619.2
Saint Vincent UMIC 8080.9
Samoa UMIC 4735.06
SÃčo TomÃľ LMIC 2036.12








Solomon Isl. LMIC 2338.31
Somalia LIC
South Africa UMIC 6193.17
South Korea HIC 31246
South Sudan LIC 243.267
Spain HIC 30734.1































Appendix D - Producer Earnings Pareto
Figure D.1: Pareto of main effects for
change in earnings for producer P1
Figure D.2: Pareto of main effects for
change in earnings for producer P2
Figure D.3: Pareto of main effects for
change in earnings for producer P3
Figure D.4: Pareto of main effects for
change in earnings for producer P4
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Appendix D - Interaction Plots
Figure E.1: Interaction plot for change in
spending in the LIC market
Figure E.2: Interaction plot for change in
spending in the LMIC market
Figure E.3: Interaction plot for change in
spending in the UMIC market
Figure E.4: Interaction plot for change in
spending in the HIC market
Figure E.5: Interaction plot for change in
spending in the USA market
Figure E.6: Interaction plot for change in
spending in the Total market
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Appendix F - Reservation Prices
Table F.1: Countries included in each market


















Aintablian, S. and Khoury, W. E. (2017). A simulation on the presence of competing bidders in mergers and
acquisitions. Finance Research Letters, 22:233–243.
American Academy of Pediatrics (2014). Knowing Cost.
Bare, A. (2015). December 2015 Pooled Procurement in the Vaccine Market: UNICEF’s Experience. Technical
report.
Behzad, B. and Jacobson, S. H. (2016). Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Competition with Linear
Demand: A Pediatric Vaccine Pricing Model. Service Science, 8(1):71–84.
Behzad, B., Jacobson, S. H., and Robbins, M. J. (2015). A symmetric capacity-constrained differentiated
oligopoly model for the United States pediatric vaccine market with linear demand. IIE Transactions (Institute
of Industrial Engineers), 47(11):1252–1266.
Behzad, B., Jacobson, S. H., and Sewell, E. C. (2012). Pricing strategies for combination pediatric vaccines based
on the lowest overall cost formulary. Expert review of vaccines, 11(10):1189–1197.
Danzon, P. M., Pereira, N. S., and Tejwani, S. S. (2005). Vaccine supply: A cross-national perspective: How do
the economics of vaccines differ in the United States from other countries, both industrialized and developing?
Dull, P., Friede, M., Hwang, A., and Hall, B. F. (2019). Meeting report: Global vaccine and immunization re-
search forum, 2018. In Vaccine, volume 37, pages 7519–7526. Elsevier Ltd.
Fox, E. R., Birt, A., James, K. B., Kokko, H., Salverson, S., and Sofflin, D. L. (2009). Ashp guidelines on manag-
ing drug product shortages in hospitals and health systems. Oxford University Press, 66:1399–1406.
GAVI (2010). Immunization Financing Toolkit The World Bank and GAVI Alliance Brief 12: The Vaccine
Market-Pooled Procurement. Technical report.
GlaxoSmithKline Communications (2014). GSK Public Policy Positions. Technical report.
Guo, Y. and Hawkes, A. (2018). Simulating the game-theoretic market equilibrium and contract-driven invest-
ment in global gas trade using an agent-based method. Energy, 160:820–834.
Hall, S. N., Jacobson, S. H., and Sewell, E. C. (2008). An analysis of pediatric vaccine formulary selection prob-
lems. Operations Research, 56(6):1348–1365.
Kaddar, M., Saxenian, H., Senouci, K., Mohsni, E., and Sadr-Azodi, N. (2019). Vaccine procurement in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa region: Challenges and ways of improving program efficiency and fiscal space. Vac-
cine, 37(27):3520–3528.
Lemmens, S., Decouttere, C., Vandaele, N., and Bernuzzi, M. (2016). A review of integrated supply chain network
design models: Key issues for vaccine supply chains. Chemical Engineering Research and Design, 109:366–384.
Martin, P., Gupta, D., and V. Natarajan, K. (2019). Vaccine Procurement Contracts for Developing Countries.
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Medicine Index (2019). About the Index - Access to Medicine Foundation.
56
Mosquera, G. (2015). Vaccine Access and Affordability in a Coordinated Market Under Stochastic Reservation
Prices. Theses.
Plotkin, S., Robinson, J. M., Cunningham, G., Iqbal, R., and Larsen, S. (2017). The complexity and cost of vac-
cine manufacturing An overview.
Proano, R. A., Jacobson, S. H., and Zhang, W. (2012). Making combination vaccines more accessible to low-
income countries: The antigen bundle pricing problem. Omega, 40(1):53–64.
Robbins, M. J. and Jacobson, S. H. (2011). Pediatric vaccine procurement policy: The monopsonist’s problem.
Omega, 39(6):589–597.
Robbins, M. J., Jacobson, S. H., Shanbhag, U. V., and Behzad, B. (2014). The Weighted Set Covering Game: A
Vaccine Pricing Model for Pediatric Immunization. INFORMS Journal on Computing, 26(1):183–198.
Smith, J., Lipsitch, M., and Almond, J. (2011). Vaccine production, distribution, access, and uptake. Lancet
(London, England), 378(9789):428–38.
The GAVI Alliance (2011). Technical report.
UNICEF Supply Division (2020). Contract awards | UNICEF Supply Division.
Ventola, C. L. (2011). The drug shortage crisis in the united states: causes, impact, and management strategies.
P & T : A Peer-Reviewed Journal for Formulary Management, 36:740–757.
Villar, J. and Rudnick, H. (2003). Hydrothermal market simulator using game theory: assessment of market
power. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 18:91–98.
Wang, B., Li, Z., Sui, S., and Qin, Y. (2009). The game analysis of price competition on different rationality.
In 2009 Eighth IEEE/ACIS International Conference on Computer and Information Science, pages 677–679,
Shanghai, China. ISEE/ACIS.
Whitney, C., Zhou, F., Singleton, J., and Schuchat, A. (2014). Benefits from Immunization During the Vaccines
for Children Program Era.
WHO GEVIT (2016). Cost estimate for vaccine deployment and vaccination for an epidemic type Ebola.
World Health Organization (2018a). 10 Facts on Immunization. www.who.int/features/factfiles/
immunization/en/, accessed 31.03.2019.
World Health Organization (2018b). Global vaccine action plan monitoring - secretariat annual report 2018.
https://www.who.int/immunization/global_vaccine_action_plan/web_gvap_secretariat_report_2018.pdf.
57
